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In the domain of reasoning and decision making, some dual-process theorists have suggested that 
people are highly efficient at detecting conflicting outputs engendered by competing intuitive 
and analytic processes (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian & Goel, 2008). For 
example, De Neys and Glumicic (2008) demonstrated that participants‘ reason longer about 
problems that are characterized by a conflict between a stereotypical personality description and 
a base-rate probability of group membership. Crucially, this increase occurred even when 
participants gave the nominally erroneous stereotypical response (i.e., ―neglecting‖ the base-rate 
probability), indicating that their participants detected that there was a conflict and, as a result, 
engaged in slow, analytic processing to resolve it. However, this finding, and much of the 
additional support for the efficient conflict detection hypothesis, has come from base-rate neglect 
problems constructed with probabilities (e.g., 995 doctors and 5 nurses) that were much more 
extreme than typically used in studies of base-rate neglect. I varied the base-rate probabilities 
over five experiments and compared participants‘ response time for conflict problems with non-
conflict problems. It was demonstrated that the integral increase in response time for 
stereotypical responses to conflict problems was fully mediated by extreme probabilities. I 
conclude that humans are not as efficient at detecting when they are engaging in biased 
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 It has long been known that reasoning and decision making are often heavily influenced by 
systematic biases. These biases have been shown to produce behaviour that tends to deviate 
substantially from ostensibly normative performance on a variety of reasoning tasks (see 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tverksy, 1982, for a review). For example, people violate utility theory, 
demonstrate overconfidence, display confirmation bias, fail to properly calibrate degrees of 
belief, allow prior belief to bias deductive reasoning, and, crucially for the current work, deviate 
from Bayes Theorem when calculating probabilities (for reviews, see Baron, 1994; 1998; Evans, 
1989; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1982; Shafir & Tverksy, 1995; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). 
 Such findings have sparked a long-running debate concerning the nature and quality of 
human rationality (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Stein, 1996). Whereas some 
argue that these biases indicate that cognition is characterized by troubling irrationalities, others 
argue that reasoning deviates from normative standards for other reasons, thereby avoiding any 
attribution of irrationality to participants (Stanovich, 1999). For example, one possibility is that 
reasoning deviates from normative standards because of simple performance errors caused by 
sporadic and temporary information processing mishaps, such as lapses of attention or memory 
deactivation (Stanovich & West, 2000).  
In a series of recent studies, De Neys and colleagues have demonstrated that participants 
are aware, albeit implicitly, when they are being biased (De Neys, Comheeke, & Osman, 2011; 
De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). 
The purpose of the current work is to assess De Neys and colleagues‘ evidence supporting the 
view that reasoning deviates from normative standards due to an additional temporary 
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information processing mishap: namely, the failure to inhibit a prepotent response cued by 
diagnostic information. Specifically, I will show that participants only detect when they are 
biased under a fairly narrow set of conditions—that their awareness is much more limited than 
De Neys and colleagues have claimed. Additionally, De Neys and colleagues have drawn fairly 
broad conclusions from their research, implying a level of generalization for which I have not 
found empirical support.  
Base-Rate Neglect 
 One of the most heavily studied of the aforementioned biases is the neglect of prior 
probability in lieu of diagnostic information during judgments of likelihood (see Barbey & 
Sloman, 2007, for a review). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) first presented evidence for this 
base-rate ―neglect‖ in what would later be referred to as the ‗Tom W.‘ problem. For the Tom W. 
problem, participants were divided into three groups. The base-rate group was given a list of 
graduate student areas of specialization and asked to rank them based on the probability of 
membership. In contrast, the similarity group was given a description of a university student 
consisting of stereotypical diagnostic information and asked to rank the same areas of 
specialization based on the similarity of the prototypical student in each area to the description. 
Finally, the prediction group was given the personality description and asked to rank the areas of 
specialization based on the likelihood that Tom W. was enrolled as a graduate student. In terms 
of Bayes Theorem, to produce the best answer, it is necessary to take into account both the 
diagnosticity of the personality description and the prior probability (i.e., the base-rate). 
However, Kahneman and Tverksy found that the mean rank for the prediction group closely 
matched the ranking for the similarity group (r = .97) and deviated greatly from the mean 
ranking for the base-rate group (r = -.67). Thus, the participants neglected the base-rate 
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information and based their response instead almost entirely on the representativeness of the 
personality description.  
The Tom W. problem was of particular importance because it demonstrated a strong bias in 
a type of judgment that is made frequently in everyday life. Kahneman and Tverksy (1973) went 
on to show that base-rate information is underweighted in surprising additional contexts. For 
example, in the ―lawyer-engineer‖ problem, participants are explicitly presented the base-rate 
information:  
 
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality 
tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. 
  
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is 
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in 
political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many 
hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles.  
 
The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is 
___%.  
  
Kahneman and Tversky found that participants relied on the representativeness of the personality 
description despite the apparent accessibility of the explicitly presented base-rate information. 
While explicitly presenting the base-rate information may make the lawyer-engineer problem 
somewhat less ecologically valid than the Tom W. problem, it does demonstrate the truly 
systematic nature of the bias.  
 It should be noted, however, that there are conditions where participants will deviate from 
the representativeness heuristic and make better use of the base-rate information. For example, 
Evans, Handley, Over, and Perham (2002) found that, when the relative size of the base-rates 
was manipulated either within or between subjects, participants gave probability estimates that 
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more closely reflected the base-rates for the larger (400 out of 1000) relative to the smaller (100 
out of 1000) base-rates. This suggests that participants are at least somewhat sensitive to 
variations in prior probabilities over repeated problem presentation. In a similar vein, 
Gigerenzer, Hell, and Blank (1988) found that participants gave probability estimates that 
conformed closer to Bayes Theory when they performed and observed the random sampling 
themselves. Findings such as these suggest that base-rates are simply underweighted as opposed 
to wholly neglected. This, in turn, indicates that the use of base-rates is strongly influenced by 
the context in which they are presented.  
Dual-Process Theory and Base-Rate Neglect 
 According to dual-process theories (for reviews, see Evans, 2008; Frankish & Evans, 2009; 
Stanovich, 2004), reasoning and decision making are based on two qualitatively different types 
of cognitive systems (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004) or processes (Evans, 2009): System 1 
(S1; also referred to as ―Type 1‖) is defined by fast, frugal, unconscious, intuitive, and heuristic 
types of processes whereas System 2 (S2; also referred to as ―Type 2‖) is slow, deliberative, 
conscious, and analytical. The key behavioural result of this distinction is that the output of S1 
processing tends to dominate reasoning such that participants will generally have quite poor 
performance on problems that elicit an incorrect intuitive response (Evans, 2008). This 
performance deficit (as compared to normative standards) is usually explained by a lack of S2 
override – i.e., participants were unable to engage in sufficient analytic processing to overcome 
their initial intuitive response (Evans, 2008; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2003; 
Stanovich, 2004).  
 In their review of base-rate neglect, Barbey and Sloman (2007) concluded that dual-
process theory best explains the various forms of the phenomenon. Specifically, Barbey and 
5 
 
Sloman state that participants tend to neglect or underweight prior probabilities because of an 
overreliance on heuristics that fail to fully represent the structure of the problem. In terms of 
base-rate problems that contain diagnostic information in the form of stereotypes (such as the 
lawyer-engineer problem above), S1 processes are thought to engender an intuitive response 
based on the representativeness of the stereotypical personality description. Base-rate neglect is 
then caused by failure of S2 processing to override the prepotent response (Stanovich & West, 
1998; 2000). This focus indicates that the mechanism that initiates S2 processing is critical in 
explaining base-rate neglect. One proposed mechanism for such initiation is conflict detection 
(De Neys & Glumicic, 2008).  
 In the lawyer-engineer problem presented above, the personality description suggests a 
different response (i.e., ―engineer‖) than does the base-rate information (i.e., ―lawyer‖). De Neys 
and Glumicic (2008) have claimed that this represents a conflict between S1 and S2: ―Dual 
process theories generally state that the analytic system is monitoring the output of the heuristic 
system. When a conflict with analytic knowledge (e.g., sample size considerations) is detected, 
the analytic system will attempt to intervene and inhibit the prepotent heuristic response [i.e., 
based on the stereotype]‖ (p. 1250). This argument has important implications for the rationality 
debate because, if conflict detection can be shown to be efficient, the primary cause of 
systematic biases may be a failure to inhibit and override an intuitive response as opposed to a 
failure to recognize that an error is being made.  
 De Neys and colleagues have assembled an impressive roster of evidence supporting their 
claim that conflict monitoring is highly efficient, thereby suggesting that base-rate neglect, in 
particular, is caused primarily by a failure of inhibition and S2 override. The first and most basic 
piece of evidence came from response time data. De Neys and Glumicic (2008) showed that 
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participants took longer to answer base-rate problems when the personality description and base-
rates were incongruent (i.e., in conflict) than when they were congruent (i.e., non-conflicting). 
The crucial assumption here is that increased response time indicates higher likelihood of S2 
processing. Thus, participants apparently detected the conflict and engaged in increased S2 
processing to resolve it. This finding is striking for two reasons. First, participants succumbed to 
base-rate neglect – choosing the stereotypical response 78% of the time on incongruent trials – 
despite the apparent increase in S2 processing. Second, participants took longer on incongruent 
trials relative to congruent both when they selected the more analytic base-rate response and 
when they selected the stereotypical response. Thus, they showed evidence of conflict detection 
even when they gave the so-called ―biased‖ or ―incorrect‖ response. Indeed, as De Neys and 
Glumicic point out, the response time increase for incorrect (stereotypical) responses to 
incongruent problems is the ―crucial question‖ because these participants, according to protocol 
analysis, are not readily utilizing the base-rate information in their explicit reasoning (p. 1252). 
Thus, an increase in response time for incorrect incongruent problems as compared to correct 
congruent problems is explained as a product of conflict detection because participants are 
basing their response primarily on the stereotypes in both cases.  
 The fundamental response time difference between incorrect incongruent and correct 
congruent problems has been bolstered by a host of additional measures, such as an increase in 
memory retrieval for base-rates found in incongruent relative to congruent problems (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008), an increased tendency to review the base-rate information for incongruent 
relative to congruent problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), and a decrease in confidence for 
incongruent relative to congruent problems (De Neys, Comheeke, & Osman, 2011). De Neys, 
Vartanian, and Goel (2008) used fMRI to show that there was increased activation in the anterior 
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cingulate cortex – which is often referred to as the conflict detection centre of the brain (Carter, 
Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998) – when participants responded to incongruent 
relative to congruent problems (regardless of whether the participant gave the stereotypical or the 
base-rate response). Additionally, they also showed an increase in right lateral prefrontal cortex 
activation when participants refrained from giving the stereotypical response to incongruent 
problems, suggesting that they were engaging in response inhibition. Together, these findings 
provide compelling evidence for highly efficient conflict detection coupled with an unreliable 
override or inhibition process.  
 There is, however, reason to question the generalizability of DeNeys and colleagues‘ 
findings beyond some particular characteristics of the set of base-rate problems used in each of 
the studies cited above. Consider the following problem form used in each of the above studies:  
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 nurses 
and 5 doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
 
Paul is 34 years old. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well 
spoken and very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time in his career. 
 
What is most likely? 
a) Paul is a nurse 
b) Paul is a doctor 
 
Here, as with the lawyer-engineer problem above, there is a conflict between the base-rate 
information and the personality description. However, there is a potentially critical difference 
between this problem and that used by Kahneman and Tversky (1973): The base-rates used by 
De Neys and colleagues are substantially more extreme (995/996/997 out of 1000). Indeed, base-
rates are often left implicit in other studies (such as for the Tom W. problem) to present 
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participants with a more ecologically valid type of base-rate problem. It is only De Neys and 
colleagues who have used such extreme values. 
 The use of extreme base-rates to demonstrate efficient conflict monitoring raises a couple 
of important questions. How obvious does a conflict need to be for it to be efficiently detected? 
Do extreme base-rates change the nature of the base-rate neglect phenomenon? If conflict 
monitoring is highly efficient, as De Neys and colleagues have claimed, participants should be 
able to detect a conflict between a stereotypical personality description and an implicit or 
moderate base-rate probability. Such base-rates are both more common in the literature (see 
Barbey & Sloman, 2007, for a review) and, arguably, more ecologically valid (Gigerenzer, 
2007). Since base-rate neglect has been demonstrated over a very broad set of conditions (e.g., 
with moderate and implicit base-rates), De Neys and colleagues‘ implication that their 
demonstration of conflict detection for base-rate problems with extreme base-rates holds for 
base-rate neglect more generally is questionable.  
 The purpose of the current work is to address these questions. To do so, a novel set of 
base-rate problems was created so that the type of base-rate information could be manipulated 
over a series of experiments. I created and pretested a set of stimuli that utilizes information 
about University of Waterloo academic majors and that differs based on students‘ beliefs about 
relative size or base-rate (e.g., there are more students who major in general arts than in 
statistics) and characteristics of the prototypical student (e.g., general arts students are thought to 
be creative and statistics students are thought to be orderly). The base-rates were then either left 
implicit (Experiment 1), made explicit at a moderate level (e.g., 70%/30%; Experiment 2) or 
made explicit at an extreme level (e.g., 995/5; Experiment 3). Finally, I replicated my findings 
using De Neys and Glumicic‘s (2008) set of base-rate problems with extreme base-rates (e.g., 
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995/5; Experiment 4) and moderate base-rates (e.g., 70/30; Experiment 5). If conflict detection is 
highly efficient across a broad range of base-rate problems, response time for incorrect responses 
to incongruent problems should be higher than those for correct responses to congruent problems 
in each of the following studies. Alternatively, conflict detection in reasoning may be mediated 
by contextual factors; suggesting low efficiency.  To maximize the ease of report Experiments 1 





 Experiment 1: Implicit Base-Rates.  Fifty-two University of Waterloo students (13 male, 
39 female; average age = 19.8 years) participated for credit in a psychology course. Participants 
completed 18 base-rate problems with implicit base-rates (see Appendix A for a full list).  Here 
is an example problem: 
 
Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students 
majoring in either GENERAL ARTS or STATISTICS. 
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 
a) GENERAL ARTS 
b) STATISTICS 
 
Problems were presented on a computer monitor using E-Prime v1.2 (Schneider, Eschman, 
& Zuccolotto, 2002). The personality descriptions for each problem contained individuating 
information (stereotypes) that always clearly favoured one group over the other. For congruent 
problems, the alternative favoured by the stereotype was consistent with the large base-rate. For 
incongruent problems, the alternative favoured by the stereotype was consistent with the small 
base-rate, thereby creating a conflict.  The base-rate probability was incongruent with the 
stereotypes in the personality description (as above) for half of the problems, and congruent for 
the other half. Taking the above example, if the personality description were to be consistent 
with ―general arts,‖ it would be a congruent problem. Congruency was counterbalanced such that 
for each pair of majors (e.g., general arts and statistics), half of the participants saw individuating 
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information pointing to the large major (i.e., congruent) and half saw individuating information 
pointing to the small major (i.e., incongruent). 
The order that the majors were mentioned was also counterbalanced such that each major 
was presented first 50% of the time and second 50% of the time, both within and across 
participants.
1
 Participants answered the problems by pressing ‗a‘ or ‗b‘ on the keyboard. 
Whether a major was presented as ‗a‘ or ‗b‘ corresponded with the order of presentation in the 
first sentence of the problem. This discrete choice paradigm was chosen to remain consistent 
with De Neys and Glumicic (2008). Problems were presented in full, one at a time. Response 
time was measured from the outset of problem presentation, and therefore included problem 
reading time. 
Instructions were adapted from De Neys and Glumicic (2008) to fit the university major 
problems. Specifically, participants were told to suppose that every undergraduate student at the 
University of Waterloo had completed a questionnaire that identified a set of personality traits 
that best described him or her. Participants were then asked to decide to which of the two majors 
the student most likely belongs.  
The problems were constructed using an online pretest (N = 130). For this, we selected a 
set of the largest and smallest majors on campus and asked participants (all of whom were 
University of Waterloo students) to rank them based on perceived size at the University of 
Waterloo. Participants were then asked to select the two personality traits that best described the 
prototypical student for each of the majors. We constructed the personality descriptions using the 
                                                            
1 Two majors were unable to be presented in such a way. Medieval studies and statistics were always 
presented to the participant either first twice or second twice. They were nevertheless presented first an equal 
number of times across participants.  
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five personality traits selected most for each major. The pairings that were used were then 
selected on difference in both ranking and personality traits.  
To validate the pairings, I used a couple of additional measures in Experiment 1 (each 
measure was completed following the presentation of the base-rate problems). First, for each of 
the 18 comparisons, participants were asked to consider both University of Waterloo majors as a 
group and, on that basis, to assign the proportion that they thought were in each major. The mean 
proportion across all comparisons was 70.2 for the actual large major and 29.8 for the actual 
small major. The individual item means for each comparison ranged from 62% / 38% (English / 
independent studies) to 82% / 18% (mechanical engineering / medieval studies).  
Second, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale the similarity of the personality 
description to the prototypical major in each comparison. The scale was counterbalanced such 
that the major intended to be linked to the stereotypes (based on the pretest) was at the high end 
of the scale 50% of the time and at the low end of the scale 50% of the time. Responses for 
linked majors at the low end of the scale were then subtracted from 8 so that a high response 
always suggested that the stereotype was similar to the prototypical major in each comparison. 
The mean rating across all comparisons was 5.2 out of 7, which is greater than 4, t(51) = 16.98, p 
< .001. This indicates that the personality descriptions were deemed to provide diagnostic 
support in favour of the targeted major in each pair.       
Participants were tested individually, with testing taking approximately 15 minutes.  
Experiment 2: Moderate Base-Rates.  Fifty-two University of Waterloo students (11 male, 
41 female; average age = 19.3 years) participated for credit in a psychology course. Participants 
completed the same 18 base-rate problems used in Experiment 1, but this time with explicitly 




Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students 
majoring in either GENERAL ARTS or STATISTICS. In this group 67% are 
GENERAL ARTS majors and 33% are STATISTICS majors. 
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 
a) GENERAL ARTS 
b) STATISTICS 
 
The explicitly-presented base rates for the 18 problems in Experiment 2 were the mean 
proportions given by participants for each comparison in Experiment 1 (rounded up to the next 
whole number). Across the 18 problems, the mean base-rate was 70% for the large major and 
30% for the small major, ranging from 62%/23% to 82%/18%. Unlike in Experiment 1, post-task 
ratings of base-rate and similarity were not elicited. Otherwise, problem set and procedure in 
Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 1.   
Experiment 3: Extreme Base-Rates.  Thirty-two University of Waterloo students (9 male, 
23 female; average age = 19.3 years) participated for credit in a psychology course. Participants 
completed the 18 base-rate problems from Experiments 1 and 2, this time with explicitly 
presented extreme base-rates (see Appendix C for a full list). 
 
Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, 
with 995 majoring in GENERAL ARTS  and 5 majoring in STATISTICS.  
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 





The proportions used for the 18 problems in Experiment 3 were identical to those used by 
De Neys and Glumicic (2008). Following De Neys and Glumicic, three base-rate ratios were 
presented with equal frequency: 995/5, 996/4, 997/3. Otherwise, problem set and procedure were 
identical in Experiment 3 to those in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Results 
 Analysis Strategy and Design.   Following De Neys and Glumicic (2008), responses 
consistent with the base-rate information were considered correct. De Neys and Glumicic (2008) 
excluded from analysis response times for nominally incorrect responses to congruent problems 
(i.e., cases in which the participant selected the low base-rate, non-stereotypical major), leading 
to the exclusion of 3% of the responses for congruent problems. This was because such 
responses are not consistent with either base-rate or stereotypical information, so their basis 
cannot be inferred. As a result, response time was analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA 
with 3 levels [responses to congruent problems consistent with base-rate and stereotype (i.e., 
correct), responses to incongruent problems consistent with base-rate (i.e., correct), responses to 
incongruent problems consistent with stereotype (i.e., incorrect)]. In addition, differences 
between levels were assessed using planned paired-samples t-tests. To cut down on variance and 
skew, response times were converted to log
10
 prior to analysis. Only extreme outlying response 
times (falling 4 SDs or more from mean) were excluded from analysis. This represented 1.3% of 
the data. 
Accuracy.   Accuracy was analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with 2 levels 
(congruent, incongruent). As is evident from Table 1, a substantial decrease in accuracy was 
observed for incongruent problems relative to congruent problems in each of the following 
experiments, all F‘s > 68.1, all p‘s < .001. This indicates a neglect of the base-rate information, 
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the degree of which differs across the three experiments, suggesting sensitivity (between-
subjects) both to the explicit presentation and to the change in extremity of base-rate 
probabilities. 
 
Table 1. Mean accuracy as a function of problem type for Experiments 1 to 5 (standard errors 
are in parentheses). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       E1      E2      E3      E4      E5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Congruent   .84 (.02)  .90 (.02) .95 (.02)  .91 (.02) .95 (.01)   
Incongruent   .21 (.02)  .39 (.04)  .59 (.06)  .24 (.05) .26 (.05) 
Neutral        .68 (.05) .69 (.04) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: E1 = implicit base-rates; E2 = moderate base-rates; E3 = extreme base-rates; E4 = extreme 
base-rates; E5 = moderate base-rates. 
 
Experiment 1: Implicit Base-Rates.   First, it should be noted that the within-subject 
design of the response time analysis dictated that data from any participant who scored 100% (N 
= 1) or 0% (N = 6) on the incongruent problems be excluded from analysis because they did not 
contribute an observation to each of the cells in the design.  
Response time differed as a function of congruency, F(1.5, 63.9) = 19.03, MSE = .020, p 
< .001 (reported using Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of sphericity). However, as 
Figure 1a shows, this effect was caused by responses consistent with the base-rate information 
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(i.e., incongruent correct) and not by an increase in response time for stereotypical (i.e., 
incorrect) responses to incongruent problems, in contrast to the crucial finding from De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008). Indeed, a t-test revealed no significant difference between correct congruent 
and incorrect incongruent response times, t(50) = 0.25, SE = .016, p = .80. This finding indicates 
that participants apparently did not detect the conflict between the implicit base-rate information 
and the stereotypical personality description, at least as measured by response time.    
The increase in response time for responses consistent with the base-rate information is 
unsurprising as the participants in such cases are either actively considering the more analytic 
base-rate information or just are not very convinced by the particular stereotype. Both cases 
would likely require additional System 2 processing compared to relying on a salient stereotype 
to respond.    
17 
 























Note: E1 = implicit base-rates; E2 = moderate base-rates; E3 = extreme base-rates. 
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 Experiment 2: Moderate Base-Rates.   Participants who scored 100% (N = 4) or 0% (N = 
5) on the incongruent problems were excluded from analysis.       
As with E1, response time differed as a function of congruency, F(2, 84) = 10.24, MSE = 
.009, p < .001. Again, as Figure 1b shows, this effect was caused by an increase in response time 
for correct (base-rate) responses to incongruent problems. The crucial difference in response 
time between correct congruent and incorrect incongruent did not approach significance, t(47) = 
0.43, SE = .019, p = .667. This suggests that participants did not reliably detect the conflict 
between base-rate and stereotypical information in incongruent problems, even when the base-
rates were explicitly presented to them, albeit in a moderate (e.g., 70/30) form. Importantly, this 
finding cannot be attributed to a total neglect of base-rates because participants actually had 
higher accuracy for incongruent problems (39%) than did De Neys and Glumicic‘s (2008) 
participants (19-22%). This result may be partially attributable to the use of less diagnostic 
personality descriptions (i.e., our stereotypes were likely less salient) in our problems compared 
to those used originally by De Neys and colleagues. The possible implications of this are 
discussed below. 
Experiment 3: Extreme Base-Rates.   Participants who scored 100% (N = 9) or 0% (N = 
2) on the incongruent problems were excluded from analysis. 
Again, response time differed as a function of congruency, F(1.3, 26.1) = 6.01, MSE = 
.017, p = .015 (reported using Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of sphericity). 
However, as Figure 1c shows, this effect was caused by an increase in response time for both 
correct and incorrect responses to incongruent relative to congruent problems. Participants took 
significantly longer to answer incongruent problems correctly (as in E1 and E2), t(29) = 3.59, SE 
= .024, p = .001, and incorrectly, t(22) = 2.46, SE = .021, p = .022. Thus, the De Neys and 
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Glumicic (2008) finding replicated once the extreme base-rates (e.g., 995/5) that they used were 
incorporated into the present set of base-rate problems. It therefore appears that the so-called 
―highly efficient‖ conflict detection that has been reported by De Neys and colleagues over a 
series of studies (De Neys, Comheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, 
Vartanian, & Goel, 2008) is dependent upon the extremity of the base-rates that they used. 
Discussion 
 The findings of Experiments 1 to 3 suggest that the efficiency of conflict monitoring in 
base-rate problems has been overstated by De Neys and colleagues. Not only was it necessary to 
explicitly present the base-rates to participants for them to readily detect a conflict with 
diagnostic information, the base-rates needed to be presented in an extreme form.  Previous 
demonstrations of base-rate neglect have shown that it occurs in contexts involving implicit base 
rates and in contexts involving explicitly-presented moderate base rates (for example, Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973).  The present results are compatible with the idea that, in such cases, the 
conflict between individuating information and the relevant base rate is not reliably detected 
(much less overridden).  Evidence for such conflict detection seems to be limited to cases in 
which extreme base rates are explicitly presented to participants.  It is notable that, when such 
extreme base rates were presented in Experiment 3, participants typically (though not always) 
chose the high base-rate option even when it was incongruent with the individuating information.  
Thus, Experiments 1-3 collectively provide little evidence for a clear dissociation between 
conflict detection and intervention by System 2:  For the most part, it seems, participants 
presented with incongruent problems either failed to detect the conflict with base rate 
information and consequently chose the low-base-rate option, or successfully detected the 
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conflict and chose the high-base-rate option despite its conflict with the individuating 
information. 
 Before discussing the implications of this finding, it is first necessary to discuss a possible 
limitation of the previous experiments. Specifically, the personality descriptions used in 
Experiments 1-3 may have been less stereotypical than those used by De Neys and Glumicic 
(2008) and therefore may have conflicted less strongly with the base rate information in 
incongruent problems. Evidence for this comes from the increase in accuracy for incongruent 
problems in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 relative to that found by De Neys and Glumicic. In 
particular, when De Neys and Glumicic‘s extreme base-rates were used (Experiment 3), 
participants answered according to the base-rates 59% of the time. This is substantially higher 
than the 19-22% accuracy for incongruent problems reported by De Neys and Glumicic. 
Increased base-rate usage is precisely what would be expected if the saliency of stereotypes were 
to be decreased. It is possible that participants failed to detect the conflict in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 because the stereotypes used therein were not strong enough to cause a conflict 
(although this runs counter to our pretest). Of course, if that were the case, it would still call into 
question the true efficiency of conflict detection. Regardless, this possible explanation needs to 
be addressed. In the following two experiments, therefore, the above findings were replicated 




Experiments 4 and 5 
Method 
 Experiment 4: Extreme Base-Rates.  Thirty-two University of Waterloo students (14 male, 
18 female; average age = 20.5 years) participated for credit in a psychology course. Participants 
completed the 18 base-rate problems used by De Neys and Glumicic (2008) with extreme base-
rates (i.e., 995/5, 996/4 or 997/3). Of these 18 problems, 6 were congruent, 6 were incongruent, 
and 6 were neutral. The neutral problems were constructed by De Neys and Glumicic with 
personality descriptions that did not contain any stereotypes. All other methods and procedures 
were identical to the previous experiments.  
 Experiment 5: Moderate Base-Rates.  Forty University of Waterloo students (23 male, 17 
female; average age = 19.9 years) participated for credit in a psychology course. Participants 
completed the same 18 base-rate problems from Experiment 4, this time with moderate base-
rates. Parallel to Experiment 4, there were three base-rate ratios used an equal number of times: 
70/30, 71/29, 72/28. All other methods and procedures were identical to the previous 
experiments. 
Results 
Analysis Strategy and Design.   In the interest of continuity, response times for neutral 
problems were excluded from analysis. Thus, as before, response time was analysed using a 
repeated measures ANOVA with 3 levels (responses to congruent problems consistent with base-
rate and stereotype, responses to incongruent problems consistent with base-rate, responses to 
incongruent problems consistent with stereotype). As before, response times were converted to 
log
10
 prior to analysis and only extreme outliers (4 SD‘s) were excluded from analysis. This 
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represented 0.8% of the data. As with Experiments 1-3, participants who scored 100% (N = 2) or 
0% (N = 10) on the incongruent problems were excluded from analysis of response times.       
 Accuracy.   Accuracy was analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with 3 levels 
(congruent, incongruent, neutral). As with Experiments 1-3, a decrease in accuracy for 
incongruent problems was observed in both Experiments 4 and 5, all F‘s > 105.3, all p‘s < .001. 
Accuracy for Experiments 4 and 5 (see Table 1) closely paralleled that reported by De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008; 19-22% incongruent, 97% congruent, and 80% neutral).   
 Experiment 4: Extreme Base-Rates.   Response time differed across congruency, F(2, 38) = 
4.04, MSE = .015, p = .041 (reported using Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of 
sphericity). Crucially, as Figure 2a shows, this effect was caused by an increase in response time 
for both correct and incorrect responses to incongruent problems relative to congruent. 
Replicating Experiment 3 and De Neys and Glumicic (2008), participants took significantly 
longer to answer incongruent problems correctly, t(21) = 2.36, SE = .035, p = .028, and 
incorrectly, t(29) = 2.48, SE = .015, p = .019. Thus, participants were able to detect the conflict 











Figure 2. Mean response time as a function of problem type for Experiments 4 and 5. 
 
Note: E4 = extreme base-rates; E5 = moderate base-rates. 
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 Experiment 5: Moderate Base-Rates.   Unlike the previous experiments, response time 
only marginally differed across congruency, F(2, 34) = 2.76, MSE = .004, p = .078. There was, 
however, a significant increase in response time for correct responses to incongruent problems 
relative to congruent, t(21) = 2.42, SE = .018, p = .025. Thus, this difference is simply more 
modest than in the previous four experiments. At any rate, as Figure 2b shows, the crucial 
difference in response time between incorrect responses to incongruent problems and correct 
responses to congruent problems did not approach significance, t(35) = 0.67, SE = .013, p = .50. 
Critically, this demonstrates that the finding that conflict detection is limited to the case of 
explicitly-presented extreme base-rates cannot be attributed to the possibly weaker stereotypes 




―Interestingly, past studies pointing to the pervasive impact of Heuristics and 
biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) have progressively deemphasized the 
importance of normative standards in human thinking.... One could say that the 
present work helps the pendulum swing back in the other direction.... At least in 
case of the classic base rate neglect phenomenon, heuristic thinking seems to be 
always accompanied by successful analytic monitoring.‖ (De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008; Cognition; p. 1280) 
 
―Hence, this behavioral study is consistent with the present imaging findings in 
indicating that successful conflict detection is omnipresent, regardless of whether 
participants answer problems correctly or incorrectly.... At a more theoretical 
level, the evidence for successful conflict detection helps to sketch a less bleak 
picture of human rationality. Our findings indicate that people‘s thinking is more 
normative than the infamous failure to solve classic decision making tasks 
suggests. If people did not know or care about the implications of sample-size 
considerations, for example, they would not detect conflicts between their 
intuitive responses and base rates.‖ (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; 
Psychological Science; p. 488-489) 
 
  
 The above quotes clearly represent the position taken by De Neys and colleagues based on 
evidence garnered from base-rate problems with extreme prior probabilities. The present results 
indicate, however, that conflict detection during base-rate neglect is limited to the case of explicit 
presentation of extreme base-rates. Specifically, base-rate probabilities that are left implicit 
(Experiment 1) or are moderate rather than extreme (e.g., 70/30; Experiments 2 and 5) do not 
elicit increased response time when they are neglected. This crucial increase using extreme base-
rates was demonstrated here both for the De Neys and Glumicic (2008) problem set (Experiment 
4) and for a novel problem set (Experiment 3). Thus, it appears that De Neys and colleagues‘ 
description of conflict (or ―analytic‖) monitoring as always present and highly efficient is 
overstated in that it implies a level of generalizability over different types of base-rate problems 
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that is not empirically supported.  In fact, their pattern appears to occur only under very limited 
circumstances.  
 It should be noted that the present results do not directly contradict any of the primary 
findings from De Neys and colleagues. De Neys and Glumicic (2008) established the existence 
and efficiency of conflict detection under conditions where there is a salient conflict. De Neys, 
Vartanian. and Goel (2008) advanced this story by differentiating between the brain region 
activated for conflict detection (anterior cingulate cortex) and that activated for intuitive response 
inhibition (right lateral prefrontal cortex). In addition, De Neys‘ work with Samuel Franssens 
(De Neys & Franssens, 2009; Franssens & De Neys, 2009) has demonstrated the effortless nature 
of conflict detection and the powerful effects of response inhibition. De Neys and Franssens 
were also able to demonstrate conflict detection with syllogisms. Finally, De Neys, Comheeke, 
and Osman (2011) demonstrated decreased confidence for conflict problems, again suggesting 
that participants reliably detected the salient conflict.  
 Although the current work does not contradict De Neys and colleagues‘ primary findings, 
it does call into question their scope and especially their interpretation. That is, the current 
research suggests that a conflict between System 1 and System 2 outputs must reach a high level 
of saliency for conflict detection to be successful. What this indicates, then, is that conflict 
detection is not as broadly efficient as has been claimed. This is an important point because 
reasoning conflicts in everyday life surely are less obvious than even the moderate base-rate 
problems used here. Indeed, in terms of everyday probabilistic reasoning, base-rate problems 
where the prior probabilities are not explicitly presented (Experiment 1) are likely the most 




 The current work also has implications for the rationality debate. Whereas De Neys and 
colleagues claim that the ability to detect a conflict between intuition and base-rate information 
suggests that reasoners ―care‖ about ―sample size considerations‖ (i.e., probabilistic 
information), we show that reasoners will only ―care‖ if the probabilistic information is made 
very obvious. In line with the pioneering work by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), this 
does not paint an optimistic picture of human rationality. If people require such specific and 
arguably unusual circumstances to implicitly detect conflict between intuitive and analytic 
outputs, it stands to reason that people simply are not very good at detecting when they are 
biased. This is consistent with the idea that cognition is characterized by troubling irrationalities 
and also runs counter to the idea that reasoning only deviates from normative standards due to a 
temporary information processing mishap (i.e., the failure to inhibit a prepotent response cued by 
diagnostic information). Instead, the information processing mishap seems to have been that 
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Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
General Arts or Statistics.  
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 
a) GENERAL ARTS  
b) STATISTICS  
 
 
Person ‗B‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
French or Computer Science.  
 
Person ‗B‘ is shy, quiet, precise, practical and organized.  
 
Is Person B‘s major more likely to be: 
a) FRENCH  
b) COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
 
Person ‗C‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
History or Psychology.  
 
Person ‗C‘ is intuitive, helpful, self-confident, friendly and idealistic.  
 





Person ‗D‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Mechanical Engineering or Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences.  
 
Person ‗D‘ is precise, practical, competitive, orderly and arrogant.  
 
Is Person D‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Mechanical Engineering 
b) Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences 
 
 
Person ‗E‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 




Person 'E' is independent, unconventional, self confident, adaptive and shy. 
 
Is Person E‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Electrical Engineering 
b) Independent Studies 
 
Person ‗F‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Drama or Accounting.  
 
Person ‗F‘ is competitive, ambitious, orderly, organized and practical. 
 





Person ‗G‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Music or Biomedical Sciences.  
 
Person ‗G‘ is ambitious, competitive, precise, helpful and practical. 
 
Is Person G‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Music 
b) Biomedical Sciences 
 
 
Person ‗H‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
English or Women‘s Studies.  
 
Person ‗H‘ is self-confident, independent, unconventional, energetic and loud. 
 
Is Person H‘s major more likely to be: 
a) English 
b) Women‘s Studies 
 
 
Person ‗I‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Earth Sciences or Medieval Studies.  
 
Person ‗I‘ is adaptive, intuitive, realistic, ambitious and organized.  
 
Is Person I‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Earth Sciences 





Person ‗J‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences or General Arts.  
 
Person ‗J‘ is curious, unconventional, intuitive, independent and quiet. 
 
Is Person J‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences 
b) General Arts 
 
Person ‗K‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Computer Science or Music.  
 
Person ‗K‘ is creative, energetic, friendly, colourful and extraverted. 
 
Is Person K‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗L‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Psychology or Statistics.  
 
Person ‗L‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 





Person ‗M‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in 
either Medieval Studies or Mechanical Engineering.  
 
Person ‗M‘ is unconventional, independent, quiet, conservative and unpredictable. 
 
Is Person M‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Medieval Studies 
b) Mechanical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗N‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Women‘s Studies or Electrical Engineering.  
 
Person ‗N‘ is competitive, precise, serious, ambitious and organized. 
 
Is Person N‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Women‘s Studies 
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b) Electrical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗O‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Accounting or French. 
 
Person ‗O‘ is friendly, cheerful, colourful, curious and adaptive. 
 





Person ‗P‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Biomedical Sciences or History.  
 
Person ‗P‘ is conservative, quiet, organized, orderly and shy. 
 
Is Person P‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗Q‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Independent Studies or English.  
 
Person ‗Q‘ is creative, organized, colouful, punctual and helpful.  
 
Is Person Q‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗R‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Earth Sciences or Drama.  
 
Person ‗R‘ is energetic, extraverted, loud, creative and colourful. 
 
Is Person R‘s major more likely to be: 









Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
General Arts or Statistics. In this group, 70% are General Arts majors and 30% are Statistics 
majors. 
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 
a) GENERAL ARTS  
b) STATISTICS  
 
 
Person ‗B‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
French or Computer Science. In this group, 29% are French majors and 71% are Computer 
Science majors. 
 
Person ‗B‘ is shy, quiet, precise, practical and organized.  
 
Is Person B‘s major more likely to be: 
a) FRENCH  
b) COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
 
Person ‗C‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
History or Psychology. In this group, 28% are History majors and 72% are Psychology majors. 
 
Person ‗C‘ is intuitive, helpful, self-confident, friendly and idealistic.  
 





Person ‗D‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Mechanical Engineering or Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences. In this group, 70% are 
Mechanical Engineering majors and 30% are Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences majors. 
 
Person ‗D‘ is precise, practical, competitive, orderly and arrogant.  
 
Is Person D‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Mechanical Engineering 





Person ‗E‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Electrical Engineering or Independent Studies. In this group, 71% are Electrical Engineering 
majors and 29% are Independent Studies majors. 
 
Person 'E' is independent, unconventional, self confident, adaptive and shy. 
 
Is Person E‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Electrical Engineering 
b) Independent Studies 
 
Person ‗F‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Drama or Accounting. In this group, 28% are Drama majors and 72% are Accounting majors. 
 
Person ‗F‘ is competitive, ambitious, orderly, organized and practical. 
 





Person ‗G‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Music or Biomedical Sciences. In this group, 30% are Music majors and 70% are Biomedical 
Sciences majors. 
 
Person ‗G‘ is ambitious, competitive, precise, helpful and practical. 
 
Is Person G‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Music 
b) Biomedical Sciences 
 
 
Person ‗H‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
English or Women‘s Studies. In this group, 71% are English majors and 29% are Women‘s 
Studies majors. 
 
Person ‗H‘ is self-confident, independent, unconventional, energetic and loud. 
 
Is Person H‘s major more likely to be: 
a) English 
b) Women‘s Studies 
 
 
Person ‗I‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Earth Sciences or Medieval Studies. In this group, 72% are Earth Sciences majors and 28% are 




Person ‗I‘ is adaptive, intuitive, realistic, ambitious and organized.  
 
Is Person I‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Earth Sciences 
b) Medieval Studies 
 
 
Person ‗J‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences or General Arts. In this group, 30% are Atmospheric and 
Planetary Sciences majors and 70% are General Arts majors. 
 
Person ‗J‘ is curious, unconventional, intuitive, independent and quiet. 
 
Is Person J‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences 
b) General Arts 
 
Person ‗K‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Computer Science or Music. In this group, 71% are Computer Science majors and 29% are 
Music majors. 
 
Person ‗K‘ is creative, energetic, friendly, colourful and extraverted. 
 
Is Person K‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗L‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Psychology or Statistics. In this group, 72% are Psychology majors and 28% are Statistics 
majors. 
 
Person ‗L‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 





Person ‗M‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in 
either Medieval Studies or Mechanical Engineering. In this group, 30% are Medieval Studies 
majors and 70% are Mechanical Engineering majors. 
 




Is Person M‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Medieval Studies 
b) Mechanical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗N‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Women‘s Studies or Electrical Engineering. In this group, 29% are Women‘s Studies majors and 
71% are Electrical Engineering majors. 
 
Person ‗N‘ is competitive, precise, serious, ambitious and organized. 
 
Is Person N‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Women‘s Studies 
b) Electrical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗O‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Accounting or French. In this group, 72% are Accounting majors and 28% are French majors. 
 
Person ‗O‘ is friendly, cheerful, colourful, curious and adaptive. 
 





Person ‗P‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Biomedical Sciences or History. In this group, 70% are Biomedical Sciences majors and 30% are 
History majors. 
 
Person ‗P‘ is conservative, quiet, organized, orderly and shy. 
 
Is Person P‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗Q‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Independent Studies or English. In this group, 29% are Independent Studies majors and 71% are 
English majors. 
 
Person ‗Q‘ is creative, organized, colouful, punctual and helpful.  
 
Is Person Q‘s major more likely to be: 






Person ‗R‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of all UW students majoring in either 
Earth Sciences or Drama. In this group, 72% are Earth Sciences majors and 28% are Drama 
majors. 
 
Person ‗R‘ is energetic, extraverted, loud, creative and colourful. 
 
Is Person R‘s major more likely to be: 







Person ‗A‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 995 
majoring in General Arts and 5 majoring in Statistics. 
 
Person ‗A‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 
Is Person A‘s major more likely to be: 
a) GENERAL ARTS  
b) STATISTICS  
 
 
Person ‗B‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 4 
majoring in French and 996 majoring in Computer Science. 
 
Person ‗B‘ is shy, quiet, precise, practical and organized.  
 
Is Person B‘s major more likely to be: 
a) FRENCH  
b) COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
 
Person ‗C‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 3 
majoring in History and 997 majoring in Psychology. 
 
Person ‗C‘ is intuitive, helpful, self-confident, friendly and idealistic.  
 





Person ‗D‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 995 
majoring in Mechanical Engineering and 5 majoring in Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences. 
 
Person ‗D‘ is precise, practical, competitive, orderly and arrogant.  
 
Is Person D‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Mechanical Engineering 
b) Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences 
 
 
Person ‗E‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 996 




Person 'E' is independent, unconventional, self confident, adaptive and shy. 
 
Is Person E‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Electrical Engineering 
b) Independent Studies 
Person ‗F‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 3 
majoring in Drama and 997 majoring in Accounting. 
 
Person ‗F‘ is competitive, ambitious, orderly, organized and practical. 
 





Person ‗G‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 5 
majoring in Music and 995 majoring in Biomedical Sciences. 
 
Person ‗G‘ is ambitious, competitive, precise, helpful and practical. 
 
Is Person G‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Music 
b) Biomedical Sciences 
 
 
Person ‗H‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 996 
majoring in English and 4 majoring in Women‘s Studies. 
 
Person ‗H‘ is self-confident, independent, unconventional, energetic and loud. 
 
Is Person H‘s major more likely to be: 
a) English 
b) Women‘s Studies 
 
 
Person ‗I‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 997 
majoring in Earth Sciences and 3 majoring in Medieval Studies. 
 
Person ‗I‘ is adaptive, intuitive, realistic, ambitious and organized.  
 
Is Person I‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Earth Sciences 





Person ‗J‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 5 
majoring in Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences and 995 majoring in General Arts. 
 
Person ‗J‘ is curious, unconventional, intuitive, independent and quiet. 
 
Is Person J‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences 
b) General Arts 
 
 
Person ‗K‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 996 
majoring in Computer Science and 4 majoring in Music. 
 
Person ‗K‘ is creative, energetic, friendly, colourful and extraverted. 
 
Is Person K‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗L‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 997 
majoring in Psychology and 3 majoring in Statistics. 
 
Person ‗L‘ is orderly, organized, precise, practical and realistic. 
 





Person ‗M‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 5 
majoring in Medieval Studies and 995 majoring in Mechanical Engineering. 
 
Person ‗M‘ is unconventional, independent, quiet, conservative and unpredictable. 
 
Is Person M‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Medieval Studies 
b) Mechanical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗N‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 4 
majoring in Women‘s Studies and 996 majoring in Electrical Engineering. 
 
Person ‗N‘ is competitive, precise, serious, ambitious and organized. 
 
Is Person N‘s major more likely to be: 
43 
 
a) Women‘s Studies 
b) Electrical Engineering 
 
 
Person ‗O‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 997 
majoring in Accounting and 3 majoring in French. 
 
Person ‗O‘ is friendly, cheerful, colourful, curious and adaptive. 
 





Person ‗P‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 995 
majoring in Biomedical Sciences and 5 majoring in History. 
 
Person ‗P‘ is conservative, quiet, organized, orderly and shy. 
 
Is Person P‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗Q‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 4 
majoring in Independent Studies and 996 majoring in English. 
 
Person ‗Q‘ is creative, organized, colouful, punctual and helpful.  
 
Is Person Q‘s major more likely to be: 




Person ‗R‘ was selected at random from a group consisting of 1000 UW students, with 997 
majoring in Earth Sciences and 3 majoring in Drama. 
 
Person ‗R‘ is energetic, extraverted, loud, creative and colourful. 
 
Is Person R‘s major more likely to be: 
a) Earth Sciences 
b) Drama 
 
 
